‘Political Economy and the Good Life’: exploring postliberalism and Catholic social teaching

CAMBRIDGE – A couple of days ago the Telos-Paul Piccone Institute hosted “Political Economy and the Good Life: The 2024 Postliberalism Conference” at Corpus Christi College, Cambridge – where TS Eliot first delivered the lectures that became The Idea of a Christian Society.

To bring together speakers ranging from Maurice Glasman and Phillip Blond to the Plough and First Things’ Susannah Black Roberts and Dan Hitchens respectively, it tethered strongly critiques around the “crisis of liberalism” to the Catholic social teaching tradition.

As the conference began, a manifesto was simultaneously published online, exclaiming that “today’s crisis is one of liberalism’s own making.” Co-written by seven leading academics, including the distinguished theologian Professor John Milbank, the language of “social solidarity”, “communitarian”, and “subsidiarity” littered its pages.

Aiming to craft a “new Christian Humanism,” as Susannah Roberts aptly described it, the delivery of papers felt less like a coincidence and more like a deliberate echo of Eliot’s formula. The conference’s aim seemed to be better described as less a hammering out of a political agenda but, as Pusey House researcher John Ritzema put it, to begin “changing the public imagination”.

Ritzema argued that the “soulless rule by lanyard” could be dethroned by a “sacramental” vision that reimagines polity – perhaps even viewing the Oxford Movement as a postliberal experience.

Postliberalism in the English sense then does not need to be shaped by American Republicans softened by centuries of liberalism. It can aspire to something deeper, richer and without mention of those wayward Founding Fathers.

JD Vance, the incoming vice-president of the United States, has often been described as a Catholic postliberal. But over two days of presented papers, UK postliberalism made one thing clear: it has little interest in being “Americanised”. The British formulation distances itself from foreign policy realism and nation-state worship. Instead, it charts a more distinct, perhaps more introspective, course for the movement.

Lord Glasman put it well in reference to Donald Trump’s recentl Tweet against the “human cost” of automation: “Today is a Catholic working-class fighting for the good life against the transhumanist billionaires who want to build condos on Mars… the best thing about this is you do not have to talk to liberals anymore.”

The UK strain of postliberalism will not shy away from tackling a looming tension: Silicon Valley’s flirtation with the movement. To prevent corruption by disaffected free-marketeers looking for a new ideological home, the ambiguities in postliberalism’s creed must be confronted and clarified. Without this, the movement risks being co-opted by the very forces it seeks to challenge.

Postliberalism has faced scrutiny for being “hollow,” a movement with a broad tent of interested speakers stretching from Michael Gove to Dan Carden MP. What unites them isn’t a shared vision but a loose, negative cohesion against the ruling orthodoxy. As Tom Holland quipped during the final panel, “I don’t know what it [postliberalism] means.” If their speakers still are scratching their heads, the movement’s identity crisis might be its biggest obstacle.

Precisely because of its vagueness, postliberalism has the power to captivate a broad audience. For Professor Alison Milbank, its strength lies in putting the “transcendent good” first, relegating “reputation or efficiency” to a “second order” priority. This worldview creates space for the Left Conservatism of Miriam Cates to converse with the Blue Labour ethos. Phillip Blond was clear, as long as the “anywheres” are opposed, a range of cohesive policies can emerge.

The papers presented sought to carve out postliberalism’s own niche, setting it apart from the rising ideas of National Conservatives, Cooperativism, and even the enigmatic philosophy of “far centrism” (a term coined by one particularly inventive participant). The result? Catholics came across as equipped with an unbending intellectual toolkit for reforming society. After all, who better than those with a history of moral rigour, social cohesion, and the occasional tendency to carry entire civilisations on their shoulders?

Kicking things off, John Milbank quipped: “When you think of a fire alarm, don’t think of the Final Judgment.” But let’s be honest: if this movement is to gain momentum, maybe we should start thinking about damnation as a motivator. Nothing screams “urgency” like the threat of brimstone, and so postliberalism should embrace theology as its guiding distinction.

The manifesto promised “virtue in the service of the common good,” but Tom Holland’s theological angst stole the show: “What do we do if we are neither Jew nor Greek in Christ, but the Jew doesn’t want to be in Christ?” A profound question, answered with the practical wisdom only the Jewish, chain-smoking Lord Glasman could provide from the back of the room: “Go for a cigarette.”

And honestly, isn’t that the most postliberal solution of all? Smoke, reflect, and let the ashes fall where they may.

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