Rights, Catholic Principles, and Prudence

When we have political disputes in the country, one way of trying to help clarify matters would be to remind the interlocutors of the relevant moral principles that should govern their disagreement. Murdering innocent people is wrong, so if abortion is murdering innocent people, we should rule it out. That’s clear. But rarely is the application of the general principle as simple and straightforward as that, and big problems arise when interlocutors move too quickly from a general principle to a conclusion about what ought or ought not to be done in specific circumstances, as though, given the authority of the general principle, their disagreement has found its terminus. Often, it hasn’t.

As Thomas Aquinas points out, although it is true that all lying is wrong, it doesn’t follow from this general moral principle that a government should pass laws against all forms of lying. “Laws imposed on men,” says Aquinas, should be in keeping with their condition, for, as Isidore says (Etym. v, 21), law should be possible both according to nature, and according to the customs of the country.” Therefore, he says, wise legislators do not “lay upon the multitude of imperfect men the burdens of those who are already virtuous, viz., that they should abstain from all evil. Otherwise these imperfect ones, being unable to bear such precepts, would break out into yet greater evils.”

I just stated what I take to be an important principle from “the common doctor”. Does this alone tell us whether the U.S. should have stricter or less strict laws against slander? Not even close. That determination would require, in addition to a great deal more information about the nature of public media in the country, a prudential judgment about whether and how such a law would work in practice in a country such as the United States with the traditions and customs it has inherited.

Immigration

Some people say that immigrants have a right to immigrate. Others insist that countries have a right to secure their borders. When the issue is framed in these terms, it is nearly impossible to craft any compromise. Many Americans believe that rights are absolute; they are “trumps” on any cost-benefit analysis. If I have a right to own a gun or a right to publish pornography, then this right outweighs any utilitarian analysis of the social costs of people exercising that right. The government would need a “compelling interest” to restrict that activity, and that restriction would need to be highly specified, not too broad or general. So, on this view, the right to immigrate outweighs the social costs of taking in a host of immigrants; although, by the same logic, the right to police one’s borders outweighs any suffering of those denied entry to the U.S. There must be a better way of discussing the challenge of immigration.

The situation is no better—I would argue it is immeasurably worse—when the debaters invoke religious claims in their rhetoric. If the pope says, “Catholic moral principles insist that immigrants have a right to immigrate,” and then some other bishop responds, “Catholic teaching holds that countries have a right to defend their borders,” they have not helped resolve the issue, they have merely taken sides in an ideological debate. Except now, the stakes are even higher, because now, if you disagree, you are not only wrong, you’re a bad Christian. That doesn’t help.

This problem arises not only due to the inflexibility of rights language; it arises as well when people imagine that they can move directly from the statement of a general principle to a conclusion about what ought or ought not to be done in a specific circumstance without a prudent consideration of the specific circumstances. So, for example, it is a principle of Catholic social justice that we ought to have a “preferential option for the poor.” The problem arises if I jump immediately from that general principle to the conclusion: “Catholic social justice demands that we raise taxes and increase Medicaid payments.”

Now, it may be the case that we should raise taxes and increase Medicaid payments, but that conclusion would depend on a prudential consideration of various issues. Catholic social justice also demands that we provide adequate education for the youth, that we invest in arts and culture, that employers pay a living wage, that we provide for the common defense of the country from crime and invasion, that we not spend recklessly and burden future generations with debt, that we not bury our charitable activities in large, unresponsive, corporate bureaucracies.

In other words, Catholic social justice demands a lot of things. But one overriding requirement is that we make prudential judgments about the common good, which is something too few of the individual claimants on the public purse appear to have in mind.

Just war principles

What about the war in Ukraine? Some conservatives have recently pulled out of their back pocket one of the principles of the Catholic just war tradition that says something like one shouldn’t wage a war one has no chance of winning. From this principle, the conclusion is immediately drawn that Ukraine should stop fighting and accept whatever “peace treaty” Putin and Trump might agree upon. Now, again, this might be the thing Ukraine should do, but that decision would depend on a host of prudential judgments about whether Putin is likely to rearm and attack again, whether Russia should be allowed to keep territory it gained through military aggression, and whether any sort of neutral “buffer force” would actually deter another invasion, given that such buffer forces rarely deter invaders or else it draws all sides into a wider war.

So too, there are considerations to take into account about the United States getting “entangled” with Ukraine if there is corruption in their government and a lack of accountability for the resources that we have devoted to their cause.

And yet, it seems oddly inconsistent that some conservatives who claim they don’t want the U.S. to be “entangled” in Ukraine seem eager to have the U.S. set up mining operations in Ukraine. Some have circulated a video of a professor at Columbia telling his students that the war in Ukraine is mostly the United States’ fault because the U.S. expanded NATO to the East, and this made Russia nervous because a NATO presence is an “American” presence, which is intolerable to Russia as a Russian presence in Canada would be intolerable to us. This, I think, is an odd claim since we tolerate a Russian presence just off our coast in Cuba. But more the point, one can only draw this conclusion by ignoring Putin’s claims that Ukraine doesn’t exist, that it is and always has been a part of Russia, and his repeated attacks on Ukraine. Now, however, the logic for some seems to be that, even in spite of all this grief and anxiety over NATO expansion, Putin will just sit back and do nothing while the U.S. drains Ukraine of all the mineral wealth that Putin so desperately wants. The question remains whether, to what extent, and how the United States should be “engaged” with Ukraine.

So too, there seems to be something oddly inconsistent with this particular appeal to the Catholic just war principles. Traditionally, these principles have been understood to apply to countries choosing to attack another, not one defending against an unjust aggressor. I can’t help but wonder what the conservatives who are now trotting out Catholic just war principles would have said to Churchill during the Battle of Britain, to the French Resistance during the German occupation, or to General MacAuliffe who responded to a demand for surrender at the Battle of the Bulge with a one-word telegram: “NUTS!” What would they have said to George Washington when the British forced him to withdraw from New York: “George, you can’t possibly win now against this occupying British force. Surrender.” Instead, he crossed the Delaware.

Indeed, one wonders why this appeal to the just war principles is coming up now? Why not the day after the invasion? “Guys, you can’t win, no matter how long or how bravely you fight, so Catholic principles demand you should just give up now.” Perhaps Taiwan should just signal its surrender to mainland China right now since they have little or no chance of holding off the Chinese military in the long run. In other words, is the argument principled, or is it political and indeed highly selective?

There are legitimate political arguments on both sides of this debate: reasons to help defend Ukraine, reasons to draw back and try to get the Europeans to stand up and do more, and reasons not to get so involved that we risk a wider war and find ourselves challenged by China and Russia in a two-front war. My argument here is not directed at those who have come to the judgment that we should no longer support Ukraine or that our support should be much diminished. Nor have I argued that we should abandon Ukraine. My point is against those who claim that Ukraine’s surrender is somehow demanded by Catholic just war principles. It is not, any more than an “open border” policy is demanded by the principles of Catholic social justice and a purported “right” to immigrate.

My claim is that it is lazy logic to think one can move directly from a right or a principle to a conclusion about a complex moral or political situation without further prudential considerations.

The judgment of prudence

Too often, people pull out a phrase from a Church document, state it, and think the argument is over, when in fact, the discussion should have just begun. Simply insisting repeatedly: “Immigrants have a right to immigrate,” or “We have a right to protect our borders” does not resolve the question of what we ought to do and how. That requires a judgment of prudence. So too, war is terrible, and peace is better. That doesn’t mean you never need to fight wars. Understanding when and how one should fight a war in particular circumstances requires a judgment of prudence.

Moral principles are important, indeed, necessary. But those who think you can move directly from principles to conclusions without the accompanying virtue of prudence are courting disaster. And when they use Catholic principles as a cover for their ideological interests, it brings those principles into disrepute and further alienates people from the Church.

Why? Because, so often, the principle is applied selectively. Very few of the people spouting it would have insisted Churchill surrender during the Battle of Britain. So too, very few of the people insisting on obedience to this particular principle in this situation have shown equal fervor when it came to applying other Catholic moral principles, just as so few of those who demand obedience to Pope Francis on immigration have shown equal fervor when it came to applying the Church’s absolute prohibition on abortion.

Liberals in America seem to have no sense of how hypocritical they appear when they insist on the teachings of Catholic social justice in economic matters—interpreted, suspiciously, just the way progressive Democrats do—and yet simply brush off the Church’s teachings on sexual morality and the family. And yet, so too, conservatives seem to have little sense of how hypocritical and cynical they appear when they insist on some Church principle that seems to fit their demand of the moment—interpreted, suspiciously, in line with what the Trump administration happens to want—and then simply brush off other Church teachings they find politically inconvenient.

Too few have the patience to engage in discussions of the necessary depth. We prefer the political equivalent of the WWE smack down. People like to state big general principles or pious ideals with little or no concept of the consequences of applying them or of how we might prudently apply those principles to the actual people in the actual circumstances. Catholics are tempted to the same lazy logic using their Church’s principles and ideals, which they seem to think will make their conclusions more insulated from critique, especially by other Catholics. That is a mistake, not only of principle but also of prudence.

Catholic World Report